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Abstract
Increasingly liberal states are facing challenges from populist movements. This
paper argues that the prison writings of Antonio Gramsci can provide important insights
into the phenomenon and how to counteract it. The first two sections outline a set of
Gramscian analytical tools: hegemony, non-hegemony, passive revolution, and
Caesarism. These theoretical tools are then applied to different periods of the Third
Republic of France, 1870-1940. This paper looks at this French example because it
features unique relationships between populism, ideology, and the experience of
liberalism prior to World War II. The third section demonstrates the implications of nonhegemony within international society, and how it affects and shapes states’ domestic
lives and inter-state relation
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Introduction: Antonio Gramsci and the Populism Moment
The extensive carceral works of Antonio Gramsci provide a comprehensive set of
analytical tools for analyzing the rise of populism today. As evidenced by the successes
of candidates like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the United States, and
movements such as Brexit in Great Britain and “Le Front National” and “Les Gilets
Jaunes” in France, a backlash fueled wave of populism is increasingly submerging
western societies. Former bastions of liberalism are slowly succumbing to illiberalism as
a result of this upsurge. Outside of the Western European and American contexts,
populism is also on the rise in Modi’s India, Duterte’s Philippines, Netanyahu’s Israel,
and Orban’s Hungary.
Gramsci provides an interesting diagnosis of the possible shifts from stability to
instability, or from hegemonic societies to non-hegemonic societies. Populism, as
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau have shown, is not necessarily illiberal in nature. 1
Yet, non-hegemonic features in liberal societies – populism, for example – can pave the
road to illiberalism. Neither non-hegemonic societies nor populist movements have predetermined socio-political outcomes. Post-World War I history shows that misdiagnosed
situations may have catastrophic effects, as is evidenced by the way Western liberal
societies embraced first populism and then extreme forms of nationalism and fascism.
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Without an understanding of the relations between civil society and the state, such
confusion can further contribute to the erosion of liberal democracy.
Furthermore, the existing literature on hegemony has a tendency to ontologically
prioritize hegemonic societies and their structures, at the expense of non-hegemonic
studies. What is seldomly discussed is the tenuous line between hegemony and nonhegemony, and how one form of regime can lead to the other. My thesis addresses this
lacuna. Based on Antonio Gramsci’s writings, my thesis focuses on the fragility of
societies and the conditions that lead them to populism (or extreme nationalism).
Gramsci’s notions of hegemony and non-hegemony are central to the understanding of
these conditions. “In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and
gelatinous,” he wrote, adding that:
“in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and
when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed.
The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of
fortresses and earthworks…”
In this sense, Gramsci sees the “West” as hegemonic, as the structural relations of its civil
society remained uncontested during State crises.
More space will be devoted to developing hegemony and non-hegemony in the
next section, but – to put it simply – the demarcation between the two lies in differing
levels of civil society fragility. Hegemonic legitimacy is usually based on a social
consensus—which does not need to be universal in content. A state is legitimate when the
dominant group (or the hegemonic group) in civil society can persuade subaltern groups
of the benefits of a given worldview. This persuasion allows the dominant group to
relinquish control of coercive tools embodied in political society. This separation
2

between civil society and political society allows the state to mitigate conflict between
disparate social groups. Historically, hegemony has not been the dominant mode of
socio-political organization because of the difficulty in establishing and institutionalizing
social relations based on consensus.
Non-hegemonic societies, such as Russia prior to World War I, are different. In
these societies, the majority of the population does not share a common worldview. For a
fragmented civil society, or a weak hegemonic group, the institutions of civil society are
an integral part of the state. When civil society is fractured and its institutions
“gelatinous,” leaders can easily appeal to catch-all populist or nationalist ideologies to
unify a discontented population. This does not mean that non-hegemonic societies are
necessarily societies in turmoil, as was the case in Russia prior to the Bolshevik
revolution, but they are nonetheless prone to social upheaval. In hegemonic societies,
where some form of bureaucratic institutional impartiality exists, the majority of the
population consents to the main ideology of the state. In contrast, in non-hegemonic
societies, the state controls the vacuum created in the absence of a strong civil society.
The transition from hegemonic to non-hegemonic society is the focus of this
thesis, which is shaped by four overarching questions: First, how do Gramscian analytical
tools help us understand the shift to social fragility (or vice-versa)? Second, what is the
historical legacy of these social changes? Third, what are the implications of nonhegemony on the international system? Fourth, how can a Gramscian analysis offer
insights to counter populism and nationalism in the West? This thesis argues that
Gramscian tools help us understand the anatomy of illiberalism and the fragility of
liberalism both in the domestic and international spheres. Furthermore, based on
3

historical lessons of the interwar period, Gramscian analysis provides possible strategies
for countering contemporary authoritarian trends.
This thesis is divided into three sections. The first two sections outline a set of
Gramscian analytical tools: hegemony, non-hegemony, passive revolution, and
Caesarism. These theoretical tools are then applied to different periods of the Third
Republic of France, 1870-1940. I selected the French example because it features unique
relationships between populism, ideology, and the experience of liberalism prior to
World War II. The third section demonstrates the implications of non-hegemony within
international society, and how it affects and shapes states’ domestic lives and inter-state
relations. Finally, I conclude with some considerations about a Gramscian strategy for
overcoming the rise of illiberalism.

4

1. Gramscian Perspectives on the Foundations of Populism
Before continuing, I will provide definitions for the key concepts of this paper.
The first section defines populism; the second Gramsci’s use of hegemony and nonhegemony. Once these definitions are in order, the paper will move on to conceptualize
them in terms of the dynamics of social relations and individual consciousness.
Unpacking Gramscian concepts is a precarious task, requiring some overarching
discussion and contextualization. To begin, Gramscian concepts are presented in a
dichotomous manner, with examples including hegemony and non-hegemony, common
sense and good sense, or the reactionary and the progressive. These concepts take on the
appearance of ideal types encompassed within sets of dualisms. The defining of these
dualisms, as with hegemony and non-hegemony, relies on a certain fixity of
characteristics or outcomes which are identifiable beyond specific contextualization. The
form of this presentation is liable to be troubling to some readers. Few, if any, social
realities fit into a dualistic conceptualization, making it ill equipped analytical tool.
Fortunately, Gramsci’s concepts are not arrested in a typological state. Instead,
this dualist problematic leads to their necessary inclusion in Gramsci’s historicism, which
transforms these static typologies into historical and developmental processes. This
historicism takes on the form of social processes made understandable through certain
concepts which only exist at the conjunction within the particulars of a historical
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moment. Therefore, hegemony, rather than existing as an inflexible ideal type, can
analyze many different historical moments by adapting them to the relevant context.

1.1 Defining Populism
This paper prefers its own slightly refined definition of populism over one of the
many extant within populism literature. This definition’s modifications serve to better
situate the term within the context of the Gramscian analytical tools. It is not likely to fit
all potential groups which might be labelled as populist, but it is adequate for
understanding an important dynamics of hegemony and non-hegemony. This distinction
is vital to understanding populism in hegemonic terms.
To fit these two principles, this manuscript defines populism as follows:
1. Populism represents the divisions between both “the people” and “the elite,”
and “the people” and the existing social order, regardless of that order’s
hegemonic status. “The people” are those individuals which make up a populist
movement, having become sufficiently conscious of social contradictions.2 “The
elite” serve as a political stand-in for the inadequacies of said order, given their
status—or perceived status—as its chief beneficiary and protector.
2. Populism is “ideologically thin,” a concept which attempts to capture the
association between populist movements and stronger ideologies (liberalism,
fascism, socialism, etc.).3 Populism does not carry any necessary political agenda

In Section 2.3 “The Populist Conscious,” I deal with the individual’s development of consciousness of
social contradictions in greater detail
2
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in the sense of thick ideologies; instead, it maintains a fluid development in
relation to the “will of the people.”
The definition developed here is derived from Gramsci’s two principles of
political science:
“1. That no social formation disappears as long as the productive forces which
have developed within it still find room for further forward movement;” and
“2. That a society does not set itself tasks for whose solution the necessary
conditions have already been incubated.”4
Populism fits into these two principles as both representative of productive forces without
room for forward movement and as a potential solution to this lack of space and forward
motion.
This conception of the relationship between populism and hegemony runs counter
to those put forward by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. For them, populism acts as a
counter-hegemonic force, pushing against the prevailing order in an attempt to overturn
the existing order.5 This is at least partially correct; under certain conditions, populism
presents challenges to hegemonic apparatuses and institutions in ways which have
historically been thought of as nonviable. While correct when discussing populism in a
hegemonic state, this conception can also obfuscate an understanding of populism as the
outcome of the transition to a state of non-hegemony.

4

Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (New York: International Publishers, 1971) 106-107.

5

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 2nd Edition. (London: Verso,
1985)

7

But populism can also be the product of a non-hegemonic period. Populism in
non-hegemonic societies have far different social implication then when occurring in
hegemonic society. From both analytical and strategic perspectives, we should
understand populism as both an individual response, and a social tactic of, the process of
hegemonic transition. Populism therefore gains a manifold number of causes and pursuits
which may be more or less successful depending on historical contingency.
The indeterminacy of a populist movement is therefore both limited and prone to
adopting some deeper ideological premise. The relevant literature commonly
conceptualizes such movements as “transitory” phenomena – the precursors to the
development of a thicker ideology.6 It is important to differentiate how hegemony and
non-hegemony condition populism and its potential for transitioning into a “thick”
ideology. In particular, we must avoid making populism dependent on the ideology it
might become, rather than focusing on the becoming itself. Within a populist moment,
there exists a multitude of potential outcomes which are, in part, defined by the process
which develops them.

1.2 Social Dynamics in Hegemonies and Non-Hegemonies
The principle concern in this section is how social dynamics influence civilpolitical contexts and to what extent this influence generates populist sentiments. Within
hegemonic and non-hegemonic societies, there are certain non-specific processes which
can help explain the phenomena. Collectively, these processes fall under the general
Gramscian term “Passive Revolution.” Before engaging with this term, however, this
6
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paper cannot proceed without a more adequate definition of hegemony and nonhegemony.
Hegemonic Society: Characterizing the relationship between a hegemonic society
and a hegemonic state are two factors which, acting in unison, together constitute
hegemony: (1) The dominant classes of civil society having developed a consensual
relationship with a broad majority of subordinate classes within civil society; and (2) the
dominant classes of civil society having relinquished direct control over political society
in favor of institutionalized structures coordinated by a bureaucratic class. 7
Institutionalization of the state structure is the foremost means through which the
dominant classes can achieve their hegemony, as its effects feed into the development of
consensus. Institutions reduce the primacy of the coercive elements of the dominant
social group through the structuring of social action. The reduction in coercive elements
coincides with disconnecting these structures from class influences through the use of
impartial state institutions. These institutional boundaries between civil society and
political society improve the legitimacy of the state—and, by proxy, their dominance of
the socio-economic hierarchy. Consequently, the continued success of hegemonic
institutions is dependent on the acquiescence of some portion of the subaltern social
groups, as well as their acceptance of the leading nature of the dominant classes.
Non-Hegemonic Society: Non-hegemonic society is built upon the integration of
the dominant classes into the political structure through the weakening of institutional
separations which demarcate society. In non-hegemonic society, there continues to be a
dominant group, but this group has either lost—or failed to achieve—the legitimacy
7
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necessary for it to establish the institutional structure of hegemony. Without legitimacy,
the stability of the consensual social hierarchy is threatened. In the absence of hegemony,
subordinate and subaltern groups may challenge the social hierarchy. In order to maintain
their social position, the dominant groups are compelled to rely on the coercive elements
of political society; establishing consensus is eschewed in favor of forging alliances of
convenience and pursuing strategies of coercion.
Coercion deepens a society’s struggles, heightening inter-group conflict. Stripped
of the independence of institutions and bureaucracy, the state becomes staffed with the
ranks of the dominant group. This furthers social fragility by connecting the dominant
group directly to government failures. The state and its dominant class become welded
together; the actions of the state becoming increasingly synonymous with the interests of
the dominant group. The near-constant potential for instability in this form of civilpolitical union prompts subaltern groups toward escape from the social hierarchy. What
we are concerned with here is why this escape manifests itself as populism.
Gramsci’s concept of “passive revolution” is useful for understanding the
instability inherent to non-hegemonic civil society. While attempting to maintain their
dominance, the civil-political class will often attempt what Gramsci identified as passive
revolution: a means of establishing a moment of pseudo-consensus between themselves
and the other classes while maintaining the status quo of socio-political relations.8
Gramsci refers to these periods of socio-political contestation as a “crisis of authority”:
If the ruling class has lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer “leading” but only
“dominant”, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great

8
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masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer
believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis consists precisely in
the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a
great variety of morbid symptoms appear. 9
This definition takes populism as one potential symptom of the death of the old order and
the birth of the new.
While passive revolution represents changes to some portion of the social
structure, the dominant civil classes—seeking to avoid institutional separation of their
coercive capacities—are seldom distanced from the political coercive apparatus. For this
reason, non-hegemonic states often fail to escape from the cyclical nature imposed by
passive revolution.. Passive revolution perpetuates the status quo through two other
Gramscian analytical tools, co-optation and trasformismo, which are means of preserving
the existing civil-political structure through incremental reform and political obfuscation.
Co-optation represents the incorporation of amenable elements of the subaltern
classes’ and non-dominant classes’ concerns into the socio-political order. By
strategically addressing these groups, the dominant faction fends off drastic social
change. The effects of these partial methods tend toward temporary satisfaction, as these
concessions are likely to increase pressure for further reform. The dominant classes rarely
wish to give up control over the political levers, fearing the retribution of their
subordinate classes, and this reluctance to relinquish power limits the extent to which
they will go in addressing the concerns of the other groups.
By virtue of their necessity to appease certain social groups and the potential
threat of ceding too much power, the dominant group of a non-hegemonic society is

9
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particularly prone to inciting conflict. Application of coercive force on points of social
anguish or on the wrong groups leads to the widening of social discontent by revealing
the coercive dangers of the state to otherwise passive social groups. Conversely, not
enough control can leave room for the extreme elements of civil society to operate and
grow, challenging the structure of the civil-political relations dominated by a particular
class. Structural balancing does not occur as a single moment, but is rather a continual
process.
Trasformismo is a process by which political factions in non-hegemonic societies
show increased homogeneity in their political views. This is done in order to privilege the
politics of the dominant social class over all other political viewpoints. This can occur in
two ways. The first, which Gramsci refers to as molecular trasformismo, involves
particular political figureheads going over to a “moderate political class” whose interests
are largely in line with those of the dominant group. The second involves the political
mass going over to some new moderate position following a divisive political event. Both
manifestations of trasformismo have the effect of instilling politics with a lack of
constructive discourse and practical action regarding the contradictions of society.
Instead, the entire political system begins to appear corrupt or unproductive, as politics
becomes reduced to its own class—with its own interests.10

1.3 The Populist Conscious
This portion of the paper looks at how the growth of an individual’s agency can
become a source of populism within both hegemonies and non-hegemonies. Embodied
10
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within each state are complex sets of tensions which Gramsci developed under the
concept of the “dual perspective.” Examples of these dual perspectives include “force and
consent, authority and hegemony, the individual and the universal moment.”11 The
perspectives are useful for formulating the dialectical tensions in society. Social relations
formed the first half of this dialectical formula. In this section I will theorize the
development of an individual’s populist consciousness as a perspectival counterpart to
the dynamics of social relations.
To understand an individual’s reactions to the organization of society, Gramsci
developed the concepts of “common sense” and “good sense.” With these terms, one can
situate the consciousness of the individual within that individual’s historical conditions.
Gramsci’s use of “common sense” differs from the meaning of self-evident or reasonable
knowledge. Instead, his conception is ingrained in that knowledge which forms the
intellectual foundations of society. These foundations permeate throughout social
relations, acting as a sort of civil “concrete” for the epoch. This serves to reinforce the
sets of socio-economic relations endemic to any historical moment.
Coupled with the Gramscian notion of “common sense” is its dialectical
counterpart: “good sense.” “Good sense” represents those ideas and feelings an individual
may have which contradict the “common sense” of the age. Awareness of this “good
sense” is coupled with the recognition of injustice bound up in practical aspects of
“common sense.” The individual has this “good sense” in active contradiction to the
modes of thought dominant within the historical epoch in which they live. In coming to
this “good sense” realization, the populist individual becomes conscious of the
11
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contradictions at play in their socio-historical epoch. The hegemonic-reinforcing
mechanism of “common sense” becomes susceptible to the conscious developments of
the individual. The worldviews associated with the “common sense” begin to lose their
legitimacy within the individual, weakening the relationship between the individual and
hegemonic society.
This is not only a conflict between the intellectual foundations of the individual
and society, but also a tension internal to the individual. Before the individual ever comes
into conflict with broader society, they fight against the “common sense” embedded
within themselves. As Gramsci writes, no one individual is purely made up of “common”
or “good” sense, but is rather in a near constant dialectical struggle between the two.
Their division, competition, and synthesis culminate in a consciousness of new
perceptions and conceptions.12 Through this process, the individual becomes aware of the
distance between their own thought and the actions they take in the world, and this
awareness becomes the basis for the individual’s populist emancipation from the social
order.
The combination of these stages of conscious development has the potential to
move into a mode of populist consciousness. The development of this political
consciousness furthers discontent regarding the social, political, and economic structure
which populist individuals view as reinforcing the societal contradictions they find most
aggrieving. Hence, in changing themselves they begin to change the world:
To transform the external world, the general system of relations, is to potentiate
oneself and to develop oneself. That ethical “improvement” is purely individual is
an illusion and an error: the synthesis of the elements of individuality is
“individual”, but it cannot be realised and developed without an activity directed
12
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outward, modifying external relations both in nature and, in varying degrees, with
other men, in the various social circles in which one lives, up to the greatest
relationship of all, which embraces the whole human species. 13
Particularly under non-hegemony, the individual is in an indeterminate political space
and likely without clear political organization. Traditional political parties may have
difficulty adapting to the new populist stances of their former constituents, leaving these
individuals unrepresented. Instead, it seems likely that the newly “conscious” tend to fall
back upon deeply-grounded beliefs, psychological pathologies, and political actors able
to make an emotional appeal to the populist individual.
Theodor Adorno’s notion of an “Authoritarian Personality” also explains this
problem. In his study of the growth of illiberalism, Adorno argued that there are
identifiable factors which make certain individuals more sympathetic toward
authoritarian or otherwise illiberal regimes. 14 These factors limit the sublimation of
thought to a one-sided, purely illiberal affair. What I am arguing here is that, first, these
sublimated desires lack a definitive political orientation and can be liberal or illiberal;
and, second, that the desires are instead derived from two independent sources, one being
particularities (psychology and sociology) of the individual, the other the “common
sense” against which the individual is reacting. Furthermore, the process of actualization
is critical to understanding the political outcomes of these suppressed desires, which is an
important part of section four.

13
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Central to this political awakening is the perceptual superiority that comes with
consciousness of contradiction. To distinguish themselves from the “unconscious,”
populists form a loose self-conceptualization around the notion of “the people” vs. “the
elite.” “The people” exist only for those who have uncovered these “truths” of the system
and rejected those who are perceived as supporting the system in spite of its
contradictions. Once these political lines have been drawn, individuals find themselves
oriented toward a particular target of their discontent. The application of the individual
political will merely needs this directionality once its intellectual logic is constructed.

1.4 The Legacy of the Third Republic
With these two theoretical levels of inquiry now laid out, I will proceed to analyze
the Third French Republic within the context of the development of individual
consciousness and changes in social relations. The Third Republic rose out of the ashes
of the failed Second French Empire and Napoleon III Bonaparte. Seeking historical
causation is a continuous, yet fraught endeavor; instead, I will map some of the
Republic’s roots in order to better trace the recurring populism and illiberalism in French
society during this period. One event in the early Third Republic stands out as its first
hint of social discontent and illiberal potential: Boulangism.15 Boulangism’s namesake is
that of General Georges Boulanger, a figure whose ambitious political dreams threatened
what little stability the early Third Republic maintained. But before analyzing General
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Boulanger’s political virtù in the next section, we will first look at the fortuna provided
by individuals and social relations of the Third Republic.16
Following the family tradition, Napoleon III gained his imperial position in
France through a coup d’état in 1850 which swept away the short-lived Second Republic
and gave rise to the Second Empire, which came with certain measures of passive
revolution. The new emperor fashioned himself as a liberal at whose hands France was to
undergo a period of substantial reform. But for all the reforms he made to the French
political system, Napoleon III had little effect on the endemic infighting amongst the
nation’s political factions. 17 By the 1860s, Napoleon III had substantially shifted
decision-making into the authority of his parliament, while simultaneously increasing the
power of the Republican faction of French politics. This only served to exacerbate the
political infighting. On the right, the Royalists and imperial sympathizers argued against
socio-political reform, opposed by reform-minded Republican and various radical groups.
Leaving political conventions of the right-left dichotomy behind reveals further
depths to the infighting. The restoration of the Republic would ultimately unleash a
struggle to contain and pacify the radical elements of the left. This political dysfunction
matched the general dysfunction of French society. During this period of discord, no one
was more front and center than Parisians—Jacobin advocates within the new Republic

Virtù and Fortuna are the two qualities which Machiavelli argued his “Prince” required. Virtù (Virtue or
Skill) represented the political abilities of the “Prince.” Fortuna (Fortune or Luck) represents the sociopolitical context which limit or construct the “Prince’s” actions. Importantly, neither of these alone are
sufficient for the “Prince’s” political success; both are necessary in some measure.
16
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who hearkened back personally and historically to the Revolution. The struggle played
out in this French history is that which exists between all progressive and those which
support the status quo developed under the passive revolution of the Second Empire.
Opposed to them were the Royalists, bolstered by the peasants and rural
Frenchmen.18 The basis for this alliance between the conservative Royalist faction and
the rural classes can be found in the modernizing economic policies implemented by the
government of Napoleon III. Free trade policies of the 1850s and 1860s fundamentally
altered the makeup of French economic life, with the Anglo-French Treaty of 1860
exemplifying this new commercial and industrial reality. The essential purpose of this
treaty was to open up the French economic system to the manufactured goods of the
United Kingdom, pushing the formerly monopolistic industries of the French economy
out into the broader world of competition. The result was the unsettling of France’s rural
population, whose traditional agricultural goods were replaced by cheaper, massproduced equivalents. Increasingly, the urban populations of France strained under the
influx of rural farmers seeking new, competitive work. The modernizing policies also
increased rural political knowledge, a development which in turn led to growing criticism
of the existing social construction’s lack of focus on rural society.19 Soon, an amalgam of
social alliances formed the backbone of the state’s passive revolution. From these
competing political systems, with these alliances ultimately forming the foundation of the
populist discontent of the 1880s.

18
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The end of Napoleon III’s liberal regime did little to stem France’s systemic
political infighting or stabilize the state which characterized the ongoing passive
revolution. Rather, French affairs following the collapse of the Second French Empire
during the Franco-Prussian War resulted in the creation of the Third French Republic.
Along with inheriting the basic social, political, and economic failings of the Second
Empire, the founding of the Third Republic was further complicated by the conditions of
its birth. Immediately the Republican government struggled from a lack of institutional
legitimacy, war and foreign occupation, and the attempted succession of the Paris
Commune. The loss of the monarchy and return of the republic further inflamed these
reactionary tendencies. In particular, the Royalist wing emerged unified, though solely on
the condition of seeking a return to monarchy, be it Orléanist, Bonapartist or Bourbon. 20
The events of the Franco-Prussian war were traumatic for the populations of the
French capital, upending the common sense perceptions which had existed since the
French Revolution. The subsequent explosion of the Paris Commune kept Parisians in a
state of unrest and uncertainty. In summing up the results of this disruptive period, Sorel
claims, “In a country which had been convulsed by so many changes in Government, and
which consequently had known so many recantations, political justice had something
particularly odious about it…”21 The home of the revolution had its mass revolutionary
self-perception shattered following the violent repression of the Commune movement in
1871. In France, Parisian or otherwise, we find the historical embodiment of the
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Gramscian quote, “… the great masses have become detached from their traditional
ideologies and no longer believe what they used to believe previously, etc. The crisis
consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born.” 22 As we
will see in the coming sections, the struggles between old common sense and various new
senses manifesting themselves in analytically interesting ways for the establishment of
the state.
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2. Social and State Consolidations of Populism
The forthcoming section is interested in how the contents of populism become
actualized in a political program based on the constituent elements developed in the
earlier section. I conceptualize populist politics as operationalizing around three levels of
organization, Anarchism, Caesarism, and the Modern Party. These organizational
differentiations and their political implications are derived from the possible relationships
between the populist collective and populist leadership. After opening with a brief
discussion these organizational paths, I will then move onto this section’s primary focus –
the Gramscian formulation of Caesarism.

2.1 Political Paths of Populism
The emancipation of the “gelatinous” masses of individuals from their “common
sense” consciousness characteristically includes the potential for increased political
engagement. The three political pathways presented in this section take some variation on
the form of a “collectivized will, directed towards a given political objective.”23 Direction
of the collective will can come from several potential sources, differentiated by
organizational complexity. At the lowest levels of organization (Anarchism), populist
sentiments are relatively fluid as compared with rigidities of hegemonic society.
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Conversely, the higher the level of organization the closer populism gets to becoming a
“thick ideology” (the Modern Party).
At its lowest form of organization, populism shares the same unstructured and
anti-structure agenda of many anarchist movements. Consequently, populism at this level
is relatively synonymous with anarchism, both rejecting the social order due to its
perceived failings. Due to these ideological conceptions about organization, neither
populism nor anarchism is capable of significant political change alone. Within the scope
of an entire society, the diffuse nature of these discontents results in discontinuous
challenges to society, but no substantive social restructuring. This path often results in
resignation, an end-point signifying the individual’s acceptance of the inadequate social
relations and a suppression of the individual’s discontent.
This does not mean that this level of consciousness disappears, but rather,
devolves from the collective to the individual. These populist movements become a
social variation on the sublimation seen within individuals during the development of
their conscious. The consequence of this sublimation is the building of discontent within
society, which in turn amplifies the individual sublimation by removing the potential of
recognition by fellow populists’ consciousnesses. This is likely to lead to further social
and individual narcosis tied directly to unmitigated desires.
Due to its own organization weakness, populist anarchism may also join with
other groups or factions with greater degrees of structure. This generally means working
with some form of Caesarist movement or political party, on the ground that both seek to
overturn the existing political order. If anarchist movements continue to operate
independently, they risk losing internal support to these groups which offer greater
22

political change. There are several prominent cases of these coalitions, particularly on the
left where anarchists are often grouped with socialists and communists. Similarly, during
the 1930s and 1940s a number of Anarcho-Syndicalists joined growing Fascist
movements because of the movements’ lack of political success.
The inadequacies of anarchist movements often portend a more robust populist
formation, Caesarism (or interchangeably, Bonapartism). As the name would imply,
Caesarism is defined by the leadership of Caesarist figure. This leader becomes the
embodiment of the populist discontent, successfully organizing together disparate
elements of the discontent. Caesarist leaders are capable of significant feats of populist
unification delineated along two distinct dimensions, reactionary and progressive. Like
anarchism, Caesarism comes with its own organizational flaws and political ramifications
in non-hegemonic societies. The French section will show the rise, fall, and consequences
of a French Caesarist in the early Third Republic, General Georges Boulanger. His
movement, Boulangism, was one of the outcome of the socio-political convergences
shown in the earlier section and is symbolic of the political conditions throughout the
period.
The third and final potential path – which I will conclude this paper with – comes
in the form of the Modern Party, which Gramsci referred to as the “Modern Prince.” As
the highest form of organization, the qualities of the Modern Party necessarily entail the
ability for the development of new social structures. Unlike Caesarism, the party bound
to a single unifying individual, and unlike anarchism, it has no necessary ideological aim.
Instead, the Modern Party’s strength is its hegemony-like organization, establishing an
organic consensus between the collective and party leadership.
23

2.2 Caesarism and the State
Non-hegemonic societies are in a constant ebb of passive revolution, a revolution
that never changes the pre-revolutionary socio-economic relations of civil society. The
attempts by the dominant portions of civil society to (re)establish their leading role serve
only to maintain the fractious nature of the state, with neither the progressive nor the
reactionary elements winning out. Equilibrium in non-hegemonic society is axiomatically
negative, as it stalls necessary social progress and produces sublimated discontent.
Though disequilibrium has the potential to produce illiberal outcomes, it is also the only
means for liberal outcomes in a non-hegemonic society. Equilibrium necessary breeds
future instability, while only disequilibrium supplies the necessary potential for
hegemonic stability. The constant competition and conflict in the non-hegemonic society
rarely breeds a strong party, instead each side in civil society neutralizes another.
The weakness of non-hegemonic society opens it up to the entry of a third
political force, a “Man of Destiny.” Gramsci, therefore, refers to the perception of
Caesarism as the “solution” to a specific historico-political situation characterized by the
equilibrium of socio-political forces.24 Caesarist populism is, therefore, connected to this
leader endowed with the charismatic personality and savior who is uniting varied groups
from a collection of classes behind some form of anti-establishment cause. Caesarism can
also exist without a Caesar, particularly where a parliamentary system exists compromise
between the two competing factions becomes increasing possible without substantive
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civil changes.25 Coalition governments are examples par none for the capacity of modern
parliamentary governments to provide some measure solution to the problems of political
stagnancy.
As with populism, Caesarism lacks a definitive or pre-determined political
orientation. Caesarism instead is constrained and shaped by the socio-historical and
political environment it emerges from. Seldomly is Caesarism or populism defined totally
by right or left-leaning groups. Instead, they tend to incorporate diverse segments of
political life, including those within traditionally antagonistic camps. In Gramsci’s
conceptualization, Caesarism take on one of two reified dimensions, Reactionary and
Progressive. The positionality of these dimensions does not exist along the traditional
right-left political spectrum but references the ability to introduce new structures of social
relations (Progressive) versus the re-institution of the old order (Reactionary).
Reactionary Caesarism represents the general failing of the progressive forces of
society to unite fractious domestic elements. As a result of this weakness, the reactionary
Caesar forms a position attractive to disenfranchised members of society, including
traditionally progressive groups. This explains the strange alliances that are often drawn
together during cases of reactionary populism, such as the alliance between the northern
petit bourgeoisie and the southern masses in Italy during the interwar rise of fascism. 26
Furthermore, there is necessary potential for emergent political phenomena, within a
Caesarist movement. Caesarists tend to rely on actualizing the sublimated desires of
individuals, particularly when illiberal populist forms are pursued. This process creates a
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political feedback loop of recognition and self-fulfillment for the individual with the end
of political confederation.
In order to facilitate their agenda, the reactionary Caesarist may make small,
placative concessions to select progressive elements but, ultimately, the need for these
concessions is tempered by the social levels of dissatisfaction. through the co-optation of
fringe progressive elements. The program of the reactionary Caesar is conceptually
straight forward, as their expressed goal is the return of the pre-revolutionary social
ordering. Reactionaries differ in the ways in which they return to and maintain the old
societal status quo. This status quo also guarantees the return of passive revolution
following the end of the Caesar rule. Reactionary Caesarism – having failed to secure the
state through institutions – is bound to see a reversal of and backlash toward their
vulnerable agenda.
Progressive Caesarism’s potential rests on its ability to develop the necessary
social and political conditions for the development of a new hegemony. This entails the
development of a new state structure and bureaucracy and the creation of consensual
bounds between disparate groups. “Progressive” should not suggest that this form of
Caesarism brings about a hegemonic order, but rather that it provides the conditions and
innovations for change from one type of state to another type. Progressive Caesarism –
by the nature of its reliance on the unitary figurehead – is structurally weak in the same
sense as reactionary Caesarism. Similarly, this figurehead holds together the progressive
coalition, without whom the bounds between groups begin to dissolve.
Gramsci shows this dissolution, and how to counteract it via a new hegemonic
state, by using two historical examples. First, the defeat of Napoleon I France returned
26

the French state to the rule of Bourbon Kings rule until the Revolution of 1848. In the
absence of a figure to continue to the historically progressive achievements of Napoleon
France reverted to the old monarchical order, prioritizing the role of the nobility in the
social order. Second, Caesar needed Augustus following his death to affirm his vision for
an Imperial Rome, shows how the changes the progressive Caesarist need to be continued
and institutionalized by a second movement or actor. Caesar had not built a hegemonic
society, though he laid the foundations for one. Therefore, without Caesar Augustus, the
state would have relapsed back into passive revolution. As Machiavelli wrote in The
Discourses, “Hence kingdoms which depend on the virtue of one man do not last long,
because they lose their virtue when his life is spent, and it seldom happens it is revived by
his successor.”27 Therefore, it is wise to be wary of the appearance of the progressive
Caesar, as it is likely that the progressive elements they bring to society will live on only
as long as the Caesar lives or maintains his body of support.
Following the rise of the Caesar, social discontent begins to find the capacity to
find life within the state apparatus. This is always tempered by the degree to which the
Caesar has managed to build up an organizational capacity to overcome the institutional
roadblocks of the previous social relations. This can lead to varied sets of potential
outcomes between the anti-hegemonic force headed by the Caesar and the remnants of
the old order. For historically determinant reasons it is not inconceivable to find that the
older order cannot be overcome by the means used by the Caesarist leader.

27

Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus of Livy, ed. Bernard Crick (London:
Penguin Books, 1970) 141.

27

The example Gramsci provides of the Italian Risorgimento is a prime example of
the faltering of a mobilized discontent force. Though these forces alongside Garibaldi and
Mazzini helped to unify the Peninsula, they were unable to overcome the old apparatuses
of regionalism and the church. These old foundations of the Italian order found new life
in the Kingdom of Italy, hindering its ability to adapt to the new age of modern life.
While manifesting as progressive forces, they proved unable to formulate a political
structure committed to the progressive nature which they endeavored upon, instead
falling back into the comfortable apparatuses of the old order which has not been
eradicated. This led to the establishment of the Moderate Party which would dominate
Italian politics until the rise and fragmentation of the Italian Socialist Party.

2.3 French Caesarism
The summation of populism and Caesarism are near synonymous with each other,
with populist political movements replacing the revolutionary movements and coup
d’états that traditionally ushered in Caesars. In the words of Gramsci, “In the modern
world, with its great economic-trade-union and the party-political coalitions, the
mechanism of the Caesarist phenomenon is very different from what it was up to the time
of Napoleon III.”28 This is referring to the changes that came with the introduction of
mass political parties, an event which happens to coincide with the rise of the Third
Republic in France. During this period, Caesarism would see the abandonment of its old
mechanism of military coup, as was seen in the rise of Napoleon III, and instead utilize
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the growing political particularization which stimulate mass parties. Boulangism,
therefore, represents one of the first forces within France to have harnessed this tool.
We can see a similar story throughout the Third Republic of France in the
inability to overcome the old, entrenched structural supports of the Second Empire and
Republic. Like a tumor hidden within a body, these elements of the old French state
continued to stir up continual problems for the health of the French body politic. This
comes in many forms throughout the life of the Third Republic, but on of the first
manifestations of this sickness came in the form of the General Boulanger and the
incidents surrounding his rise and fall.
Boulanger rose to prominence out of the failures of the French military during the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 and the subsequent political unrest which followed. In
many ways, Boulanger rose to meet falling revolutionary fervor of the Parisian masses,
the disgruntled anti-republican nobility, and the common French peasant gaining in
political stature through this age. For the Parisian, Boulanger embodied the part of the
revolutionary tradition which so often ran in concert with a growing nationalist sentiment
which had gripped the city following Franco-Prussian War and Paris Commune. For the
nobility Boulanger represented the potential for a return to an imperial, or at least
monarchical, state much in the same way the Bonaparte family came to be held prior to
the Second Empire. Lastly for the commoner, Boulanger was the new outsider to the
system, shaking all the various establishments of the old orders, whether they were
monarchical, republican, or Parisian Jacobin.
So, for a period, Boulanger represented a great threat to the system of order which
the new republican government had thrown up under the joint strain of invasion and
29

abdication. But from these societal alliances that strengthen the Boulangist movement we
can see the remnants of the old orders, the revolutionary, the noble, the peasant. 29 None
of these received the full break from the previous social relations that they were due
under this new age, which is what would ultimately lead them to this populist figure.
Boulanger would prove an incapable individual for securing the state. During
elections in 1889, the Parisian people elected Boulanger as a deputy by overwhelming
number. Based on this populist support, a coup d’état seemed near certain. What hindered
Boulanger was ultimately himself, blundering and procrastinating on his political
ascension until point at which the people lost faith in him. Having caused much
discontent amongst the masses and threatening the stability of France domestically and
internationally, Boulanger would eventually go into a self-imposed exile.30
There is Gramscian logic in Boulanger’s failure. As a relatively new productive
force, mass party politics had a significant developmental process throughout the Third
Republic. Given this potential for forward development, it seems unlikely that Boulanger
could have effectively toppled the French state. This is not to say that it was impossible,
for in the moment after the 1889 elections there was great potential had Boulanger’s will
been added to that of the people. “In the modern world, only those historico-political
actions which are immediate and imminent,” Gramsci writes, “…can be mythically
incarnated by a concrete individual.” 31 Ultimately, Boulanger was incapable of being
either immediate or imminent, and therefore his moment passed into history.
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For these reasons, the end of the Boulangist period of French politics signaled
neither stability nor an end to the populist fervor. With Boulanger’s disappearance went
the royalist faction – the previously dominant political group – still alive but only ever to
lurk in the shadows of French politics. What replaced it was the mass parties of the
nationalists, with their growing and more out-spoken anti-Semitism. This would
inevitably lead to the next great crisis of the Third Republic, the Dreyfus affair,
particularly as these social forces where newly unbounded from their old party
commitments and personal loyalties to Boulanger.
The relationship between the soon to be Action Française and former royalists
was imbedded from the start – its founder Charles Maurras himself a royalist until
1898.32 With the culmination of the Boulanger crisis, the remnants of the old French
social order finally collapsed. The political organization of these right populist forces was
a continual project for the French right. In particular, French Caesarist advocates
recognized they required a new “man of action” who would be able to take decisive
action. For one socialist turned nationalist, Gustave Hervé, this figure might be found in
another general, General Pétain: “If, just between us, Boulanger was a fake, Pétain is no
fake, he is pure and modest glory.” 33 Throughout this period of French history, some
figures never ceased searching for the figure which might return France to the glory of its
past, which lead to the rhetorical and literal elevation of Caesarists.
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3. Populism, Gramsci, and International Relations
International relations has a relatively large body of work dedicated to
understanding Gramscian hegemonies in the modern world. The same cannot be said for
non-hegemony, whose consequences remain relatively unexplored within international
relations, to deleterious consequences. I seek to explore some of these consequences in
this section. First, this requires establishing the relationship between hegemony and nonhegemony in the international system. The second section analyzes how international
non-hegemony affects the domestic life of states through trasformsimo. The final section
will look at how populism – or Caesarism – influences inter-state relations.

3.1 Non-Hegemony and International Relations
The introduction of Antonio Gramsci’s carceral works to the field of international
relations is now nearly thirty years old. Both fields have generated a significant number
of works detailing the role of hegemony in international relation. Yet the vast majority of
the Neo-Gramscian perspectives in the field have not significantly changed perspectives
from those initially formulated by Robert Cox and Stephen Gill nearly three decades ago;
a perspectives largely devoted to hegemony.34 35 Often these apply the consensus-based
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notion of hegemonic relations to the relations between states, as they provide a
particularly powerful explanation of both international capitalism and liberalism. By
achieved internal legitimacy and order, hegemonic states become the leaders of
international order, assuming roles as great powers or superpower on the strength of their
civil societies.
Gramscian analysis has been applied with good reason, given the context of the
Western socio-economic dominance since the end of World War Two. Throughout this
period the West formed a hegemonic bloc – with the United States as the leading group –
which dominated much of the international system. The international order is
predominately structured on institutions and international bodies similar to those of
western domestic societies and globally, and this order remains underpinned by a
restrained coercive force. In this system, non-hegemonic states under this system
eventually found themselves co-opted into the Western hegemonic international order.
International hegemonic order must be preceded by a hegemonic domestic order,
without this internal unity the state will be in a rather unsound position in comparison to
the states it is challenging. Times are changing in the international system in this sense.
The international Western consensus in increasingly struggling to support its position
under the weight of domestic populism. Potentially for the first time since the interwar
period, international society is entering a period non-hegemony – therefore, the most
pressing questions in international relations are about it impacts.
Like with non-hegemonic domestic society, non-hegemonic international system
is a place of both contestation and potential. This results in both periodic stagnation and
conflict, but also the entry of new figures, states, and ideas, which may create this new
33

order. The coming of these ideas and figures to the world stage embodies the potential for
a necessary epochal transition into some new form of international societal arrangement.
Most important is the creation of a space for change. Throughout this section I use the
word movement to represent this change, in part because it is intentionally vague. Just as
with domestic societies, non-hegemonic international society has no definite character
other beyond its lack of consensus. Due to the diffuse nature of international society,
potential outcomes become increasingly manifold. The particularities of each society
become increasingly autonomous points of development, unhampered by an international
order.
The period of non-hegemony is a space of potential development for civil
societies and states, beyond which states lose their assumed universality and take on the
particularities of its epoch. Like with the individual, this period is characterized by the
consciousness of the state. This development of the state, now domestically in the form of
civil-political union, causes it to uncover its own unhappiness in these international
particularities and begins some type of international reorientation. This drive for
international change is driven at the level of domestic society, as the distinction between
the two levels becomes increasingly blurred by the civil-political union. This
international movement is caused by the unmooring of the traditional class structures and
the traditional state orders as they exist in the international “common sense”, instead
being seen as immense contradictions through a growing “good sense.”
As the masses of society become aware of the political potential of nonhegemony, so too do states change to fill the new potential at the international level.
There are two ways in which states are affected by a non-hegemonic international order
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are trasformismo and Caesarism, which will be discussed in the following two sections.
These are not the only concepts which states must contend with in non-hegemony, but the
others fall outside the scope of this paper. Having previously developed the two concepts
better allows for their comprehension, as their international application requires only
slight modification. Therefore, the following sections will touch on the impacts of the
concepts in a non-hegemonic international environment.

3.2 Domestic Life in International Non-Hegemony
Trasformismo gains new contextualization and implications when applied to the
international system. Rather than acting as a domestic political flattening, trasformismo
under international hegemony becomes a means of applying methods adopted from an
international hegemon in order to stabilize the domestic structure of civil-political
relations. The socio-economic structures of international hegemonic society can provide a
source of legitimacy for the dominant class of non-hegemonic societies to draw upon,
strengthening their rule over the subordinate classes without the introduction of
legitimate domestic institutions. As a consequence, the dominant social class is able to
maintain power without institutionalization of the socio-political structure.
Trasformismo is incapable of fully implementing the structure of hegemonic
societies nor does it attempt to establish a unique hegemony in its own right; this would
weaken the attachment of the dominant classes to the political society. Instead, it erects
an internationally legitimate edifice on their weak civil structure. Thus, when the
international hegemony falters, the impacts are felt throughout states dependent on this
source of stability. Examples of this include the proliferation of Western-dominated
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international economic institutions (World Bank and IMF), which develop the domestic
economic structure of developing states. Often when this occurs, it provides stability to
old civil orders, propping up the structure of social, political, and economic relations
rather than producing a new, domestic international order.
Just as the hegemonic apparatus tends to spread itself to other states through
trasformismo, the same can be said of non-hegemony at the level of international society.
States not only feel this impact through the loss of an external source of stability, but also
in the spread of individual consciousness. Borders are permeable to either the ideational
or material changes within other nations. Just as we make the assumption that hegemonic
influences flow into other states through co-optation and transformismo, so too must we
accept that through the same practices counter-hegemony is spread. Regarding this
Gramsci says:
“The drive for renewal may be caused by the combination of progressive forces,
which in themselves are scanty and inadequate (though with immense potential,
since they represent their country’s future with an international situation favorable
to their expansion and victory).”36
The failure of a domestic progressive force may be found to be insufficient for bringing
about a new hegemonic bloc, and therefore may fall back upon practices drawn outside
the domestic social arrangements.
Similarly, just as under hegemony, the transfer of non-hegemony does not go
unmediated during transmission and adoption. “Here too is the place to recall the
Hegelian parallel (carried over into the philosophy of praxis) between French practice
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and German speculation.”37 Each civil/political society is in a continual process of
mediating, through social and state forces, between potential hegemonic ideas and
counter-hegemonic forces. In this sense, the form and function of populism carries local
particularity, adapting to the individual cases of non-hegemony. In some cases where two
states are closely related, either by geography, diplomacy, culture, etc., these
dissimilarities may be lessened, but they will still maintain unique qualities.
The reason for this is because of the particularities inherent in each state. Without
the guiding light of a hegemonic state, each individual state is more likely to follow a
relatively unique path. States during this period do not live in vacuums, singularly
focused on the development of their domestic societies. Instead they peer across borders;
states observe how their neighbors successfully mediate consensual relations within their
society – an eventuality which may be taken as an imminent threat. This notion will be
returned to in the next section, where becomes increasingly important within the
discussion of Caesarism.
Throughout the Third Republic the struggle of becoming structured social
relations and produced the intellectual currents of non-hegemonic reaction and progress.
The chronicler of this previous age, Ze’ev Sternhell, is noted for have described these
counter-currents in their fluidity and indeterminacy. Constituting neither the right nor left
of politics, these anarchists and syndicalists of the era constituted a definitive counterhegemonic movement - as well as the forerunners of fascist movements. Both Georges
Sorel in France and Antonio Labriola in Italy produced their synthetic propositions out of
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the potentiality of this indeterminate period which had long existed within their
countries.38 Both of these writers shared in an epoch of relative international nonhegemony, and as a result their ideas following across national boundaries and
influencing the intellectual development of both each and their states in a mediated way.
Internationally, there is a final force which some states must contend with –
namely the remnants of the last international hegemony. Depending on the degree of
institutionalization of the international system, the bulwarks of old hegemonies may be
difficult to get rid of. This is particularly the case in formerly hegemonic states, where the
international hegemony originated from. This is due to the shared development between
the domestic and international levels. The attempts to strengthen hegemony during its
transition to non-hegemony can further worsen this struggle. It becomes increasingly
difficult to extricate the structure of hegemony when they are highly integrated into the
life of domestic civil society; much like a tumor within the body normal development.
The Gramscian narrative contains an often over-looked example of a hegemonic
remains in the role of the Catholic church. The Church was throughout its modern history
a remnant of an old international hegemony which clung to its home on the Italian
peninsula. This process greatly inhibited Italy’s development throughout its history, as its
development would have necessarily destroyed the Church’s power. Various Italian
thinkers worked on ways of overcoming this domestic burden in order to see Italy
flourish. Machiavelli worked through the church, using it as a materially capable force
with a Caesarist like figure in Cesare Borgia.
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Conversely, Gramsci sought to overcome the church. This had little to do with
spirituality or religion in either case, but the fulfillment of transitions being made at the
international level being mitigated within Italy. Particularly Gramsci was chasing the
emancipation of the state from religion which had been developing in France and
Germany since the Wars of Religion. One cannot underestimate the role of Rome and the
Roman church in controlling the development of an Italian state, which is why for so
many years France retained control over the Catholic church.
In the absence of a hegemonic force, states have less ability to orient themselves
within the international system. This can be beneficial, as new systems and orders are
capable of being charted in this space, potentially those more liberal then the current. But
this space also allows for increases in competition and conflict. Under non-hegemony, no
state knows which formulation of civil-political relations will create a new hegemony.
States may be increasingly fearful of the advantages gained by their neighbor (and vice
versa). Because of this wariness, States may also begin increasing material capacities as a
way of offsetting their domestic instabilities. These tools allow for the intimidation and
control of other states, further hampering the development of a new international
hegemony.

3.3 Populist and Caesarist Inter-State Relations
In the absence of effective hegemonic transformismo, the international system is
increasingly open to the entry of dominant figures on to the international stage. Within a
non-hegemonic international order, the potentiality for a Caesarist becomes both more
varied and subjective to their state’s internal politics and the predilections of neighboring
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states. Within a non-hegemonic international society, old institutions do not disappear,
but they often do not constrain Caesarist figures due to their increased lack of legitimacy.
Without the presence of a hegemonic force, there begins to be more room for Caesarism
to navigate international society to its desires, pursuing revisionist policies if reactionary
or institutionally constructive policies if progressive.
These policies do not necessarily align with the position that the Caesarist takes
within his domestic politics but rather conform to the distinct international historicoideological construction which facilitated the Caesarists rise. Like Caesarism on the
domestic level, international Caesarism is the product of a specific politico-historical
period that fundamentally shapes what form that Caesarism will take internationally. In a
space where hegemonic states exist, the Caesar faces two options for the international
existence, either cooperation and co-optation the old hegemonic order or attempt to
join/establish an in-development hegemonic bloc.
The Caesarist may hold on to some or all of the old hegemonic institutional
system, using it to stabilize their control in the absence of domestic institutionalization.
Former international order in the hands of a Caesarist can continue to manifest some of
the effects of trasformismo through this process. In these cases Caesarism and the
international order facilitate each other through the sharing of legitimacy, the former’s
developed through their charismatic capabilities and the latter’s left over from its old
hegemonic position. Caesarists, by aligning themselves with the global hegemonic force,
can draw upon the economic, social, and political legitimation found in the hegemonic
societies to facilitate their own rule.
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Eventually the co-optative process of Caesarism will bleed the old international
order dry. Without the body of the international hegemonic order, Caesarism becomes
increasingly detached from the old institution boundaries. Like the individual gaining
consciousness, the Caesarist becomes fluid, directing action tied to domestic feeling or
emotional societal demands. This gives rise to many of the illiberal notions of
international Caesarism, particularly in the modern world. Reactionary Caesarism begins
to have the capacity to undermine the remaining international structures and virtues of the
former order in hopes of some greater domestic standing found in the past. Old
connections to the international order are scorned in favor of the possibility of grander
position and gains. Combating these revisions are the often progressive Caesars who seek
to re-enforce and reform the old international order.
The events of the Third Republic have implicit international implications bound
up in the potential of the French Revolution. In the case of the Boulanger incident we
know particularly of the concern of Bismarck regarding the potential of a unified and
vengeful France under popular leadership. For one, he was concerned with the potential
unification of the French state behind a competent leader, much the way he had recently
brought together German unification. But he was also concerned with the pressure a
revanchist French leadership would play on his own people, stirring up both nationalist
and progressives. For Bismarck, Boulanger represented the potential for both an
international and domestic revolutionary force - a meeting of the material and ideational
concerns of a new integral state. 39
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Gramsci made a similar point using the example of the French Revolution, with
its mixture of revolutionary ideas and the progressive Caesarist figure of Napoleon, to
show its sweeping international affects. “National revolts against French hegemony, and
birth of the modern European states by successive small waves of reform rather than
revolutionary explosion like the original French one. The “successive waves” were made
up of a combination of social struggles, interventions from above of the enlightened
monarchy type, and national wars-with the two latter phenomena predominating.”40 This
points to the development of new legitimized social orders developed during the
Revolution. Thought the Revolution was halted, this did not stop the spread modern state
system which proceed to other European states through the mechanisms of international
passive revolution and transformismo.
Though halted following the removal of Napoleon, the latent potential for a new
international epoch remained and continued to influence both domestic and international
socio-political life. The result of this unfulfilled potential led to it being reconstructed by
both the Germans and French to different ends within the same socio-historical period.
To what extent can we separate the French populist struggles to instill the ideas of the
Revolution from a top down manner from the German attempt? Not only are they in an
internal contestation amongst the social forces for the manifestation of an integral state,
but they seek to externalize their national birth on the international stage. These epochal
consciousnesses of the state seeks its recognition in another. It should be of little surprise
that the German state was finally birthed in the halls of Versailles.
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Before reaching this point in the German development though we must confront
the transnational implications of the French Revolution, crucially in the Revolutions of
1848. Here Gramsci points to the proliferation and mediation of the revolutionary
mindset of the French to the various other absolutist monarchies throughout Europe,
principally the Germans and Austrians. While these were not successful in terms of
governmental change, we see the laying of the entire potentiality of European
development in this ideational spread. Within this French revolutionary foundation the
rest of Europe orbited in a cycle of revolution/restoration, itself tied to the role of
Caesarist as forces of either revolution (Progressive) or restoration (Reactionary).
Much of the Third Republic is characterized as an attempt to transcend nonhegemony, allowing it to overcome being held together by disparate forces internally and
internationally. Of course, in the case of Europe these stable instabilities were utterly
dissolved during the First World War and its aftermath. As the history shows, the
potentials of the interwar turned towards reactionary forces at home and destructive
forces abroad. The League of Nations, for example, proved ineffectual for the task of
preventing the opening of political possibilities, as domestic Caesarist-like crises in Japan
and Italy developed into international crises in both Manchuria and Ethiopia.
International Caesarist movements, both reactionary and progressive, walk a delicate line
between real and temporary change. Success for either side must live beyond their current
figureheads and each must provide both a quantitative and qualitative change to the social
and economic relations both domestically and internationally. Without the solidification
of new social relations within domestic societies it is highly likely that there will be
continued unrest in the western world and internationally.
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The role of Caesarism and populism is readily apparent in today’s international
society as the discontent of populism has swelled throughout the formerly hegemonic
western societies. A variety of populist movements have swept across the United States
and Europe, emblematic of the conflict within western civil society between progressive
and reactionary groups. With the election of Donald Trump as President of the United
States, reactionary Caesarism has come to grip the domestic political reins as well a
challenge the old international order, not with progress but with a revisionism to a preSecond World War international order. The United States is not alone in this turn towards
the reactionary. Countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, and Hungary have all made
turns towards similar strains of reactionary populism.
The lack of hegemony within these countries’ domestic politics results in the rise
of Caesarist-like leaders or coalitions which introduce new social, economic, and political
fragilities both domestically and internationally. The general disassociation with
international organizations, the shunning of human rights concerns, and general refutation
of liberal normative values can be found to some large degree in the civil society and
political leadership of each of these states. It is this sort of reactionary and revisionist
Caesarism that receives most of the attention within the contemporary international
coverage, but there is also a strain of progressive Caesarism to be found as well.
The development of this strain of international progressivism is dependent on the
actor presented in the concluding section of this paper, the Modern Party. The domestic
Caesarist is an inadequate force for the development of a new hegemonic order due to the
localized basis for their legitimacy. To actualize a truly hegemonic international system
requires a group with broad consensual support from a wide number of states and
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localities with in the system. This entails one of two actions: Either the Caesarist
conforms to some form of international bloc, which risks the loss of domestic support.
The alternative is the development of an International Party, an international force with
consensual legitimacy from both domestic and international sources, capable of
institutionalizing the development of a new international epoch. In the section to follow, I
make the case for the development of an actor capable of harnessing these sources and
building a new social order.
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Conclusion: Modern Princes
Machiavelli ended his political treatise “The Prince” not with further political
science, but rather with an “exhortation” for the liberation of Italy. In Gramsci’s words,
“This is why the epilogue of “the Prince” is not something extrinsic, …but has to be
understood as a necessary element of the work - indeed as the element which gives the
entire work its true colour, and make it a kind of “political manifesto.” Gramsci in turn
developed his own conception of a “Modern Prince,” the emancipatory actor in potential
in modern society. Utilizing Gramsci’s “Modern Prince,” I present a similar argument for
responding to the contemporary rise in populism.

Princes and Progress
In contrast to the indeterminacy of populism, Gramsci characterizes progress by
its implicit ideological nature. This ideological disposition takes on two features: first,
ideology diminishes the universality of abstract potential; second, it exchanges these for
the particularity and subjectivity necessary to orient progress. In making this exchange,
progress moves from what Gramsci calls “speculative immanence” to “realist
immanence.”41 The distinction is one of mediation, taking the unlimited potential and
filtering it through strategic necessity, historical circumstance, and individualist
motivation. How do individuals situate themselves, society, history, etc. in relation to the
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potential immanent realities of world history? For Gramsci the answer is through their
ideological commitments to a notion of progress. The inevitability of these commitments
implicitly forces the movement from speculation to realism, by the individual and by the
movements of social forces. Of course, it is not necessarily an easy task to move from the
speculative to the real.
“Possibility is not reality: but it is in itself a reality. Whether a man can or cannot
do a thing has its importance in evaluating what is done in reality. Possibility
means freedom... But the existence of objective conditions, of possibilities or of
freedom is not yet enough: it is necessary to “know” them, and to know how to
use them.”42
Gramsci therefore, conceived of the “Modern Prince” as an actor capable of actualizing
these socio-historical possibilities of ideology into reality.
A crucial element of the movement from non-hegemony to hegemony is the
concepts of wars of movement and position; concepts which will become increasingly
important if new civil orders are to be constructed out of the non-hegemonic system. The
war of movement is the means by which a party might seize power within a state with
weak institutional structures. Little work is needed to weaken the controls of the state;
rather the party must simply mount an offensive to seize the center of power for
themselves. From this position they then can begin to construct their new state structure
and institutions. Gramsci used this example to make sense of the success of the
Bolsheviks during the Russian revolution in comparison to the failings of other
revolutionary movements.
In comparison to the empty center of Tsarist Russia, the modern West is a
veritable bastion of institutional strength, upholding the order of the day whether it is
42
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hegemonic, non-hegemonic, or some degree in-between. For the hegemonic hopeful this
creates a great difficulty in establishing a new societal structure, hence Gramsci
prescribes a war of position. In fighting this entrenched force, the attacker must be
willing to take the long route, pushing at the weaknesses of the defenses until it can storm
the walls and seize the whole apparatus. It becomes apparent then when seeing this
prescription why the progressive populist cannot win the fight, they lacks the
organizational strength to carry on beyond the individual leader and will eventually
succumb to attrition.
Gramsci envisioned the party, not as an individual but as a superstructure that
might unite the people behind a general unifying force that could extricate society from
the constant clashes between the various classes. Through its organizational structure, the
party would have the ability to carry on through the long fight against the institutional
apparatuses that strengthen the non-hegemonic order. This party would be able to control
the political apparatus while constructing a new economic and social relationship that
would do away with the old order in favor of the new. A modern party must arise from
somewhere in the contemporary world with the capacity to unite domestic and
international civil society behind a singular notion of institutional society in order to
achieve a real transition to a new civil structure.
Therefore, progressive or reactionary, there seems to be little hope that the current
state of the western societies will provide the source of stability through their collective
turn towards populism and the authority of its central guiding figures. Instead, the future
looks to be one with the conflict of civil society at the forefront of both domestic and
international politics, which if the past is any indication is a turn towards both unrest and
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violence in both spheres. The Western world will be unable to extricate itself from a
constant state of passive revolution, intercut with bouts of a Caesarist rule and the
dangers it brings with such rule. But there remains hope that an organized body will arise
with the capacity to unify disparate portions of civil society behind a more robust
structure than the progressive Caesar and create an institution capable of building a new
hegemonic order first domestically, then internationally.
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